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"Join with your brothers and sisters
and strike out against
humiliation and indignity"
Cesar Chavez'
INTRODUCTION
On July 14, 1994, Sprint Corporation ("Sprint") fired all 235 employees
of La Conexion Familiar ("LCF'),2 a Latino long distance telephone service,
and closed the facility. The firing and closure occurred barely one week
before employees were scheduled to vote in a union representation election
at this San Francisco based subsidiary. At the time of the closure the
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("CWA"), enjoyed
overwhelming support of the workforce. Had the election gone forward and
succeeded, it would have marked the first time any division within Sprint's
world-wide long distance market unionized. In response to Sprint's action,
with the assistance of the CWA and NLRB-workers, workers at LCF
embarked on a quest for justice. The NLRB's first action was to request
injunctive relief in federal district court, which was denied.
The denial of injunctive relief was followed by a two-month trial before
National Labor Relations Board Administrative Law Judge Gerald Wacknov
("AL"). In an August 30, 1995 opinion the ALJ upheld a finding that Sprint
had committed more than fifty violations of section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act. During the two month trial Judge Wacknov commented
that, "I don't think I've had a case with so many instances of that sort of
violations of the National Labor Relations Act in a long time.",3 Neverthe-
less, the ALJ ordered no remedy beyond a mere posting of notice of Sprint's
unlawful conduct.4 This article examines the ramifications on workers,
unions, and federal labor laws when a multi-billion dollar company is found
guilty of a multitude of federal unfair labor practices, yet emerges unscathed
for want of an effective remedy.
Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), enables the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")
to petition a federal district court for injunctive relief from an unfair labor
practice.5 Typically, 100) injunctive relief is sought by the NLRB prior to a
1. Dick Meister, For Ailing United Farm Workers, Is There Life After 30?, THE SAN
ANToNIo LIGHT, Nov. 13, 1992, at D5.
2. "La Conexion Familiar" means "The Family Connection" in Spanish.
3. See CWA NEWS (Communication Workers of America, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 31,
1995.
4. Arizona Congressman Ed Pastor aptly stated that this ruling "would be laughable were
it not so heartless." Ed Pastor, Op-Ed Article, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 12, 1996, at El.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 160() (1988). Section 10(j) provides:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint ... charging that any
person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any
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trial and a final determination that an unfair labor practice has been
committed. When an employer terminates its employees in an effort to
thwart a union election, it infringes upon the employees' section 7 right to
"self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations." Such action
also chills those employees and others from exercising such rights in the
future.6 Like other harms warranting injunctive relief, failure to immediately
remedy obstruction of a union election may leave employees with no effective
opportunity to gain a meaningful remedy after the substantive issues have
been resolved. If not remedied immediately, there may never be an
appropriate remedy after the substantive issues have been resolved. A section
10() injunction restores the status quo ante in the workplace, halting any
injustice that would otherwise be ignored and unremedied pending final
determination by the Board, a lengthy process infamous for delay.
Although section 10(j) allows for injunctive relief, the statute provides
little guidance to the courts for determining when such injunctions are
appropriate. As a result, over the years the courts have developed various
standards of interpretation based on the statutory language and legislative
history of the NLRA. Among the courts of appeal, two general standards
governing the application of section 10() have emerged.7 One standard
embraces the traditional equitable criteria test, the standard used by some
courts issuing injunctions in other areas of the law.' The other standard
focuses on the "frustration of the Act [NLRA]" and is far more lenient.9
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal strayed from these two
established approaches by promulgating a balancing of the equities test.'0
Soon after the announcement of the Ninth Circuit's new test, Sprint's
closure of LCF offered the District Court for the Northern District of
California the first opportunity to apply it. In Miller v. LCF, Inc., the NLRB
sought to enjoin Sprint Corporation from the retaliatory termination of its
employees and closing down its affiliate facility, LCF in response to
employee efforts to unionize." The Board presented overwhelming
evidence that Sprint had committed scores of unfair labor practices under
district court of the United States ... within any district wherein the unfair labor
practice ... occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition
the court shall fiave jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or
restraining order as it deems just and proper.
Id.
6. 29 U.S.C § 157 (1988). Section 7 provides in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing.. ." Id.
7. Leslie A. Fahrenkopf, Striking the "Just and Proper Balance:" A Call for Traditional
Equitable Criteria for Section 100) Injunctions, 80 VA. L. REV. 1159, 1171 (1994).
8. See Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1989).
9. See Arlook v. S. Lichtenburg & Co., 952 F.2d 367 (1Ith Cir. 1992).
10. Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
11. Miller v. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.RtM. 2911 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
1996]
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sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.' 2 Notwithstanding this evidence,
the district court denied the order. 3 As a result, LCF remains closed and
most of the 235 former employees remain unemployed today. 4
This article examines the use of 10j) injunctions with particular attention
to whether the district court in LCF, Inc., properly denied the NLRB's 10(j)
petition for injunctive relief in light of the new test developed by the Ninth
Circuit. Part I briefly reviews the legislative history of section 10(j) and
examines the NLRB's use of section 10(j) injunctions. Part II addresses the
different standards applied by the circuits, focusing particularly on the new
Ninth Circuit test.
Part HI analyzes the district court's decision in LCF, Inc. and its
consequences. In particular, this article addresses the continuing ramifications
of the federal court's assessment of the evidence supplied by the LCF
workers and CWA. The ripple effect of the federal district court's decision
is demonstrated by the ALJ's subsequent decision rendered after a two-month
trial. The ALJ upheld over fifty violations of federal labor laws, while at the
same time denying appropriate remedial action.' 5 This ripple effect
culminated with the historic Department of Labor ("DOL") hearing of
February 27, 1996, the first held pursuant to the labor side agreements of the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").16
Finally, the conclusion suggests that for section 10(j) to function
properly, courts must be willing to cast aside outdated concepts of the relative
rights of business and labor. Further, court's must enforce the intent of the
NLRA in an era of digital communications and powerful multinational
companies.
12. The NLRB commented that the approximately 1000 pages of accompanying evidence
was the largest 100) filing inthe history of the agency. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1), (3) (1994). Section
8(a)(1) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce in the exercise of' their section 7 right to organization. Section 8(a)(3)
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in "regardto hire
or tenure of employment .. to discourage membership in any labor organization." Id.
13. LCF, Inc., 147 L,R.R.M. at 2918.
14. See One Year After the Closing: Where are the Workers?, WORKER ABUSE AT SPRINT
(Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C) Oct., 1995.
15. In an interview for the Daily Labor Report NLRB General Counsel Fred Feinstein stated
that "this is the kind of situation for which section 10(j) was intended." NLRB Seeks Injunction
to Reopen Subsidiary when Latino Workers Lost Jobs, DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at D14.
16. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) is designed to improve
working conditions and living standards in the United States, Mexico, and Canada as NAFTA
promotes more trade and closer economic ties among the three countries. NAALC also provides
oversight mechanisms to ensure that domestic labor laws are enforced by each country. Pursuant
to NAALC each country has a National Administrative Office (NAO) designed to administer the
labor side agreement and consult with each signatory on labor matters. The NAO is responsible
for reviewing public submissions on labor law matter, holding public hearings and issuing public
reports. The purpose of the public hearing is to determine whether the information presented
substantiates allegations that the country in question is failing to enforce its own labor laws. TheMexican Telephone Workers Union filed a complaint with the (NAO) in Mexico. Then the
Mexican Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare, Javier Bonilla Garcia, called for MinisterialConsultations with U.S. Secretary of Labor Reich to discuss Sprint's violations of its employees'
rights. The public hearing was scheduled o ta lace after the initial trial.
[Vol. 32
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I. SECTION 10(J): A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Evolution of Section IOU)
Prior to 1932, injunctions were commonly used by employers to suppress
union organization. Employers viewed union activity, and indeed any form
of collective action, as an interference with industry's right to freely engage
in commerce. 7 The courts overwhelmingly condemned labor unions and
favored the employer's rights by regularly granting injunctions to halt union
activity.
In response to constant efforts by labor activists, Congress in 1932 passed
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, limiting the authority of federal courts to intervene
in labor disputes." Congress intended to restore balance in the resolution
of labor-management disputes by curbing the power of the federal court to
issue preliminary injunctions against union organization.' 9 As a result of
this anti-injunction legislation, the labor movement grew tremendously during
the 1940s and early 1950s.2" In the years following World War II, unions
began staging widespread strikes and demonstrations, solidifying community
support for unions. After the return of American soldiers from World War
II, massive industrial growth coupled with widespread union organization,
prompted Congress to undertake a reevaluation of national labor policies. In
1947, a strong Republican Congress passed the Taft-Hartley amendments to
the 1935 NLRA, which were intended to curtail the power of organized
labor.2 '
The Taft-Hartley amendments added sections 10(j) and (I) to the NLRA.
These provisions returned authority to the federal judiciary to intervene in
labor disputes. Sections 10() and 10(1) demonstrate the political tension
between the pro- and anti-union views of judicial intervention. These sections
allow the courts to enjoin unfair labor practices pending final order by the
NLRB.
Both sections were intended to be an exception to the general rule that
federal district courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin labor disputes. As such,
these sections were not to be used in typical unfair labor practice cases.22
Section 10(1) was designed to remedy specific unfair labor practices, primarily
17. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1161-62; See also BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WITNEY,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW 7 (6th ed. 1992).
18. Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 71-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
19. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1162.
20. Id. Between 1940 and 1945 labor unions grew from about five million members to
fifteen million.
21. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1163. See also 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1); THEOPHIL C.
KAMMHOLZ & STANLEY R. STRAuss, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD 100-04 (1980).
22. See D'Amico v. United States Serv. Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp 1075, 1081 (D.D.C. 1994).
1996]
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secondary boycotts.23 It mandated injunctive relief, requiring the Board's
General Counsel to petition a federal district court for interim relief in certain
circumstances.24
Section 10(j) is broader and provides injunctive relief for any type of
unfair labor practice charge. It is only a discretionary remedy, however, and
is subject to vigorous review by the Board. There was extensive controversy
between the House and Senate as to the primary purpose of section 10(0)
before it was added to the Taft-Hartley Act.2 ' The House argued the public
interest would be better served by allowing private parties to enforce
violations of the Act.26 The Senate, on the other hand, "felt that the public
interest would be best served by investing the Board with exclusive discretion
to seek temporary injunctive relief."'27 Ultimately, Congress compromised
by adopting both sections 10() and (1). The measure returned temporary
remedial power in labor disputes to the judiciary "so that the alleged illegal
conduct would not render the labor violations unremediable and make the
final resolution by the Board a nullity."28
The NLRB Manual on section 10(j) injunctions states in relevant part as
follows:
What distinguishes a 10(j) case from other unfair labor practice cases is the
threat of remedial failure. This threat may be demonstrated by the nature
and extent of the alleged violations, the circumstances surrounding the
violations, and the anticipated and actual impact of the unremedied
violations or "chill" upon statutory rights that is expected to continue until
a Board order issues. 
In enacting section 10(j) Congress recognized that as a result of extensive
administrative hearings and litigation to enforce Board orders, the Board had
been unable to correct unfair labor practices before substantial injury
occurred.3" Prior to the advent of temporary injunctions, employers could
violate the NLRA and achieve an unlawful objective prior to facing any legal
consequences. This made it "impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve
23. KAMMHOLZ & STRAuss, supra note 21, at 100-04.
24. Id.
25. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1164. See also Note, Temporary Injunctions Under Section
106) of the Taft Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 190-91 (1969).
26. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1164.
27. Id.
28. D'Amico v United States Serv. Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp 1075, 1081 (D.D.C. 1994)(quoting S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947)).
29. John D. Doyle, Jr., Charging Parties Left Out: Intervention In Section 100) National
Labor Relations Act Injunction Proceedings, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 833, 848-50 (1995) (quoting
National Labor Relations Board Manual on Section 100) Injunctions, May 1994 Internal NLRB
Memoranda).
30. D'Amico, 867 F. Supp. at 1081 n.3 (quoting S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8,
27 (1947)).
[Vol. 32
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the status quo, pending litigation."3  The Senate Report on section 10(j)
noted:
Time is usually of the essence [in labor disputes] and ... the relatively
slow procedure of Board hearing and order, followed many months later by
an enforcing decree of the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving
the desired objectives-the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and encouragement of the practice and procedure of
free and private collective bargaining.
32
By adding section 10(j) as an available remedy, Congress essentially put some
teeth into the bite of the NLRA.
Courts have held that section 10(j) relief is an "extraordinary remedy, to
be sought by the Board and granted by the district court only under very
limited circumstances. '33 The NLRB itself recognizes that 10(j) injunctions
are to be sought only in the most extraordinary cases.} The extensive
procedure required for seeking 10(j) relief in federal court reflects its
extraordinary nature. 5
31. Id.
32. S. Rep. No. 105. 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947), cited in Miller v. California Pac.
Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
33. Arlook v. S. Lichtenburg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 374 (1lth Cir. 1992).
34. Jerry M. Hunter, General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board 1990,
Memorandum GC 95-5: Summary of Operations Fiscal Year 1990, 1991 WL 536524
(N.L.R.B.G.C.). The Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB is composed of five major
divisions. The Division of Advice processes requests for section 10(j) injunctions. In fiscal year
1990, the Board received 157 requests for injunctive relief, yet only authorized 41 of the petitions
to be filed in district court (26%). Of the cases brought to a conclusion during that same year
the NLRB was successful in 94% of the cases, achieving either a satisfactory settlement or
victory in litigation. This evidence demonstrates that cases approved for § 10(j) petitions tend to
prevail on the merits.
35. The NLRB typically files a petition for interim relief in federal district court,
simultaneously with the Board's issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART ONE): UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
PROCEEDINGS, §§ 10310-10312 (1989). The decision to institute 10(j) action may be initiated
by request of the party filing the unfair labor practice charge with the Board or by the Board
itself upon investigation and review of the matter. Id. § 10310.1. When a regional office
concludes from its investigation that interim relief is necessary to accomplish the goals of the
NLRA, the Regional Director or Regional Attorney sends a memorandum recommending section
10Gj) relief to the General Counsel's Division of Advice for approval. Id. If the Division of
Advice agrees that injunctive relief is appropriate, it prepares a memoranda for the General
Counsel to review. Id. Then, if the General Counsel agrees that an injunction is warranted, the
memoranda is forwarded to the five-member Board for authorization. Id All five members of
the Board review the case and then decide whether to authorize a petition. Catherine Hougman
Helm, The Practicality of Increasing the Use of NLRA section 10(J) Injunctions, 7 INDUS. RE.
L.J. 594, 607 (1985). At each one of these stages, experienced, knowledgeable attorneys and
agents of the Board review the case to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that
the respondent is violating the Act and that the requested temporary injunctive relief pending
Board adjudication is just and proper. See Rosemary M. Collyer, National Relations Board Office
of the General Counsel: Report on Utilization of Section 100) Injunction Proceedings October
1, 1984 - September 30, 1988, Apr. 3, 1989, 1989 NLRB, GCM LEXIS 131, at 6.
19961
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B. NLRB Use of Section 106) Injunctions
During the first fourteen years section 10(j) relief was available, the
NLRB rarely filed petitions with the courts, in some years filing no more than
one.36 By 1980, the number of petitions filed had increased to between
forty-five and sixty petitions per year.37 Between 1984 and 1988, the
Division of Advice38 received an average of 130 cases per year from the
NLRB's regional offices, requesting review for a section 10(j) petition.39 Of
those requests, the General Counsel submitted an average of 33 cases to the
NLRB per year, seeking authorization for petition.40 The Board authorized
petitions in 161 of the 168 cases presented to it4e ' and logged a "success
rate" of 89%, with 133 successful cases out of the 150 cases resolved.42
Rosemary Collyer, General Counsel of the NLRB during that period,
attributed the successful use of section 10(j) injunctions to the NLRB's
"continued careful selection process" of cases approved for petition.43
In fiscal year 1990, the Board received 157 requests for injunctive relief
from the General Counsel, yet authorized petitions in only 41 of those
cases." The NLRB successfully prosecuted 94% of the cases brought to a
conclusion during that same year, achieving either a satisfactory settlement
or victory in litigation.4 1 In 1994, under new General Counsel Fred Fein-
stein, the Board dramatically increased its use of section 10(j) petitions.46
Despite seeking petitions with increased frequency, the Board has maintained
its high success rate.47 This demonstrates that the NLRB carefully selects
cases appropriate for injunctive relief and almost always prevails on the
merits.
Because courts are hesitant to consider section 10(j) petitions, it might be
expected that such petitions would generally be denied. But as these statistics
show, courts have tended to grant interim relief.48 The NLRB's continuous
36. Helm, supra note 35, at 610, 654.
37. Id. at 610.
38. The Division of Advice is the department of the NLRB which reviews requests from
regional officers seeking injunctive relief.
39. Collyer, supra note 35, at 6.
40. Id. Those 33 cases amounted to 26% of the requests made by regional offices. Id.
41. Id.
42. l The "success rate" is the percentage of 10(j) court victories and settlements out of
the total authorized section 10(j) cases.
43. Id. at 4.
44. See Hunter, supra note 34.
45. Id.
46. NLRB Cites Successes; FDA is Challenged, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 1994, at A16. The
Board filed 62 section 10(j) petitions between March and September 1994.
47. Id. Of the cases resolved by September 30, 1994, in 30 out of 36 cases, injunctive relief
was granted.
48. See supra notes 43-48 and Helm, supra note 35, at 635. Between 1975 and 1979 the
Board had a 81% success rate of section 10(j) petitions. Between 1980 and 1983 the Board had
a 87% success rate. Between 1984 and 1988 the Board had a 89% success rate.
232 [Vol. 32
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success rates heighten the credibility of the Board's petitions by demonstrat-
ing that the agency only selects those cases truly worthy of extraordinary
relief. When section 10(j) interim relief is administered properly by the courts
it serves as "a major weapon in the Board's arsenal in vindicating the
purposes and remedial policies of the Act."49
II. SECTION 10(): JUDICIAL STANDARDS
A. Overview
Although the Taft-Hartley Act restored authority to the judiciary to issue
injunctions, it provided no express standard for courts to apply in determin-
ing whether interim relief was warranted. The statutory language of section
10(j) provides little guidance on how to formulate such a standard. The
courts were thus forced to develop their own criteria as cases were brought
before them, relying only on the language of section 10(j) and scant
legislative history. As a result, various conflicting standards have evolved
among the courts of appeals which the Supreme Court has yet to resolve.50
B. General Standards
Initially, courts required the NLRB to satisfy a two-prong test before
granting injunctive relief. First, the Board had to demonstrate there was
"reasonable cause" to believe the respondent had engaged in unfair labor
practices as defined by the NLRA. Many attorneys at the NLRB and in
private practice have observed that district judges are less than receptive to
section 10(j) petitions.5 Judges generally view an injunction as an extraor-
dinary remedy and are consequently reluctant to order affirmative relief on
a mere showing of "reasonable cause," the standard invoked by the NLRB in
its petitions. 2 In addition, some judges resent having their dockets disrupt-
ed by a petition hearing. Others are inexperienced with the NLRA section
10(j) standards, or labor law in general, or are predisposed to oppose union
interference. 3 Furthermore, although courts are required to give deference
to NLRB expertise in 10(j) petitions, they are often hesitant to do so. 4 The
"reasonable cause" requirement, although not included in the language of
section 10), was adopted by the courts from section 10(1). The federal courts
49. Collyer, supra note 35, at 10.
50. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1170, 1175. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari for
McLeod v. General Electric, 336 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated, 385 U.S. 533 (1967), but the
case became moot before the Court could rule on the merits. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1175.
51. Helm, supra note 35, at 631.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See NLRB v. Town and Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 453 (1995).
1996]
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generally agreed that "reasonable cause" was satisfied if the Board's request
was "not insubstantial or frivolous." '
The second requirement the NLRB must satisfy to gain injunctive relief
is that interim relief is "just and proper" under the circumstances.56 The "just
and proper" prong comes directly from the language of section 10(). The
content of this standard has generated conflict among the various circuits with
two general standards emerging from past cases. They are, (1) the traditional
equitable criteria test, and (2) frustration of the Act.57
The first standard holds that the "just and proper" inquiry incorporates
the traditional equitable criteria test that courts use to determine whether an
injunction should issue in other areas of the law. This test balances "the
hardships, the likelihood of winning on the merits, irreparable harm, and the
public interest" to determine whether temporary relief is "just and proper."58
An important aspect of the traditional equitable criteria test is that by
requiring the court to balance the likelihood the NLRB will prevail on the
merits, this test effectively eliminates the significance of the first prong of the
two-prong test. If the NLRB must show a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits, the "reasonable cause" prong's showing that the petition is not
frivolous becomes meaningless.59
The alternate standard, "frustration of the Act," is far more lenient. It
requires only that the NLRB show a need for interim relief "to prevent
frustration of the remedial purpose" of the NLRA and to preserve the Board's
ultimate remedial powers.6 Courts adopting this standard argue that the
traditional equitable principles used to determine whether injunctions are
proper for private relief are inappropriate for "addressing a statutory
injunction intended to remedy public wrongs."'" The Taft-Hartley Act
vested federal courts with limited injunctive authority to assure the effective
55. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1171 (quoting Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
479 F.2d 778, 787 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976)). See also John Leubsdorf,
The Standard for Preliminary Injunction, HARv. L. REv. 525, 526 (1978).
56. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1160. See also Gottfried v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F.
Supp. 1161, 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'dper curiam, 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980).
57. For an indepth analysis of the split among the circuits with regard to "just and proper"
standards see Fahrenkopf, supra note 7.
58. Id. at 1160. The United States Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, and Seventh
Circuits have adopted the traditional equitable criteria standard. See Kinney v. Pioneer Press,
881 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1989); Maram v. Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, 722 F.2d
953 (1st Cir. 1983); Silverman v. 40-41 Realty Assocs., 668 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1160. In Kinney, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook rejected the
"reasonable cause" prong as a matter of statutory interpretation. Kinney, 881 F.2d at 488-89.
"Reasonable Cause" was not included in the language of section 100) whereas it does appear
in section 10(l). See e.g., Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
60. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1177. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Third,
Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted this standard. See Pascarell v. Vibra
Screw, 904 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990); Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel, 859 F.2d 26 (6th Cir.
1988); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co, v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967); Angle v. Sacks,
382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967); Arlook v. S. Lichtenburg & Co., 952 F.2d 367 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
61. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1174.
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enforcement of Board remedies for unfair labor practices defined by section
8(a) of the NLRA 2 In contrast, the traditional equitable criteria test applied
to private party injunctions allows for broader judicial discretion. The limited
judicial authority provided under the Taft-Hartley is more akin to the standard
used for determining administrative injunctions. This standard encourages
deference to administrative findings, establishes a presumption in favor of
granting injunctive relief,63 and more accurately reflects the congressional
intent of section 100).
C. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently announced a new, third
standard for granting section 100) injunctions. The court's formula in Miller
v. California Pacific Center strayed from precedent by creating a new test
which adopted elements from the two existing standards applied by courts of
appeal.' The new test collapses the "reasonable cause" prong and the "just
and proper" prong of the old Ninth Circuit test into a single query. Under the
Miller analysis, the court applies traditional equitable criteria to determine
whether failure to grant an injunction would frustrate the remedial purpose of
the NLRA. 65 The court in Miller stated:
We therefore hold that in determining whether interim relief under section
10(j) is "just and proper," district courts should consider traditional
equitable criteria. They must do so, however, through the prism of the
underlying purpose of section 10j), which is to protect the integrity of the
collective bargaining process and to preserve the Board's remedial power
while it processes the charge.66
The new standard espoused by the Ninth Circuit is more like the equitable
criteria test favored by some circuits, and raises the burden the NLRB must
meet to obtain an injunction.6
In 1994, the NLRB sought a 10(j) preliminary injunction in the case of
Miller v. California Pacific Medical Center, to restore nurses employed by
Children's Hospital of San Francisco to the union-represented collective
bargaining status they held before the hospital merged with non-unionized
62. See Miller v. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2911 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
63. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1175. See also Randal L. Gainer, Note, The Case for
Quick Relief. Use of Section 10() of the Labor-Management Relations Act in Discriminatory
Discharge Cases, 56 IND. L.J. 515, 534 (1981).
64. Compare Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane)
with Aguayo v. Tomeo Carburetor, 853 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. Fahrenkopf, supra note 7, at 1661 (quoting California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d at
459-60).
66. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d at 459-60.
67. Id.
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Pacific Presbyterian Medical Center.68 The merged entity had summarily
declared both facilities to be non-union after the merger. The district court,
applying the two-prong "frustration of the remedial purpose of the Act test"
granted the Board's petition for an injunction.69 The district court rejected
the hospital's argument that an injunction should issue only after a finding of
irreparable harm and likely success on the merits.70
On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and departed from
previous case law to hold that when determining whether injunctive relief is
"just and proper," the traditional equitable criteria test should be applied.7
The Ninth Circuit then decided to hear the case en bane in order to clarify the
judicial standard applicable to reviewing petitions for section 10() injunctive
relief.72 The Ninth Circuit en bane decided to abandon the previous standard
and adopt a modified traditional equitable criteria test. This test factors "the
purpose of interim relief and preservation of the Board's remedial power into
the traditional framework that informs our equity jurisdiction."'73
The court reasoned that, because Congress did not specifically state in
section 10(j) that there be "reasonable cause" to believe a labor violation
occurred, as it deliberately did in section 10(1), Congress did not intend the
two sections to be treated similarly.74 Requiring a showing of "reasonable
cause" is "confusing," the court said, because it causes the court to focus on
the preliminary investigation instead of on the likelihood of success on the
merits, as required by traditional equitable principles.75 The Ninth Circuit
held it can reasonably be inferred that the NLRB would not petition for a
section 10(j) injunction if it did not believe it had "reasonable cause." Hence,
the emphasis is not on the "reasonable cause" prong but rather on whether an
injunction is "just and proper."76 The Ninth Circuit thus eliminated what
heretofore had been the first prong of the test for granting section 10()
relief.7
7
In assessing whether the NLRB has met its burden under this new
standard, the Ninth Circuit instructed that, "it is necessary to factor in the
district court's lack of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and the
deference accorded to NLRB determinations by the courts of appeals."78 In
its decision the Ninth Circuit referred to several other cases, including
68. Id. at 449.
69. Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
70. Id. at 1115 n.1.
71. Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 991 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1993).
72. California Pac. Medical Cir., 19 F.3d at 451.
73. Id. at 456.
74. Id. at 457.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 491 (7th Cir 1989).
78. California Pac. Medical Ctr, 19 F.3d at 457 (quoting NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc.,
465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984)).
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Supreme Court decisions, which emphasize that the judgment of the NLRB
is entitled to considerable deference.1 9
The court also observed that the NLRB, rather than the district court, has
primary responsibility for declaring federal labor law policy.8" "Even on an
issue of law, the district court should be hospitable to the views of the
General Counsel, however novel."8' Finally, the court held that the NLRB
can make a "threshold showing" of the likelihood of success on the merits by
producing "some evidence" to support the alleged unfair labor practice
charge, together with an arguable legal theory. 2 The new language of the
Ninth Circuit's decision struck a middle course without impinging upon the
deference traditionally accorded the NLRB. The new test attempts to balance
the strengths and weaknesses of both the "traditional equitable criteria" test
and the "frustration of the Act's remedial purpose" test.
However, after announcing this new standard, the Ninth Circuit did not
ultimately have to decide whether injunctive relief was warranted in Miller
v. California Pacific Medical Center. By the time the Ninth Circuit rendered
its decision, the NLRB had already successfully prosecuted the underlying
unfair labor practices, making the injunction issue moot."
Nearly eight months after the Ninth Circuit established this new standard,
the district court for the Northern District of California had the first
opportunity to apply the "modified traditional equitable criteria test" in Miller
v. LCF, Inc. 4 The district court, however, denied injunctive relief. In the
opinion of the authors, the decision is inexplicable, given the compelling case
of egregious unfair labor practices which present a model of the circumstanc-
es section 10(j) was intended to remedy.
III. LCF, INC.
A. Background
On July 14, 1994, one week before employees were to vote in an NLRB
election on representation by the CWA, Sprint fired all 235 workers at LCF
and shut down the facility. LCF, a San Francisco based wholly-owned
79. Id. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat Suit & Allied Garment
Workers' Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1245 (2d Cir. 1974).
80. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d at 460.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added)
83. Id. at 461. Although the dissent agreed with the new test espoused by the majority, it
criticized the majority for failing to apply the newly articulated test to the case at hand. Id. at
461 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). It also stated that under this new standard on remand, the District
Court "would have no option other than to enter a preliminary injunction." Id. The District
Court's decision and the panel's opinion were both vacated by this decision. See Miller v.
California Pac. Medical Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Miller v. California Pac.
Medical Ctr., 991 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1993).
84. 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2911 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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subsidiary of Sprint, operated as a reseller of Sprint's long distance services.
LCF also provided customer services to Spanish language customers
throughout the West and Midwest."
Sprint, a holding company based in Kansas City, Missouri, owns Sprint
Long Distance, Sprint/United local telephone companies in 17 states, and
Sprint Cellular. 6 Sprint Long Distance, formed in 1986, is currently the
nation's third largest long distance company. Sprint holds approximately 10%
of the market, after AT&T and MCI. 7 It is also the second largest telecom-
munications contractor to the federal government, and the long distance
carrier for the Labor Department.
88
In December 1992, Sprint purchased LCF, an independent corporation
which had been reselling Sprint long distance services since its inception in
1990. Sprint and LCF became affiliated business enterprises sharing common
directors, ownership, and management.8 9 They also share a common labor
policy, and buy and sell services to each other.9"
In February 1994, organizers from the CWA met with LCF workers to
address workers' concerns regarding non-payment of earned commissions,
lack of notice of changed work schedules, restrictions on water consumption
and bathroom breaks, and wage disparities compared to other Sprint
telemarketers.9" Soon after the meeting, a workers committee was formed
and a union organizing drive began.
Within a month, Sprint bombarded LCF employees with an anti-union
campaign aimed at discouraging union activity and maintaining the facility's
non-union status.92 As part of its anti-union efforts, Sprint circulated its
"Union Free Management Guide" to Sprint managers. The guide outlines
methods for undermining efforts by workers to organize throughout all of
Sprint's world-wide operations. 93 From the outset, a centerpiece of Sprint's
anti-union campaign at LCF was the explicit threat that the facility would
close were employees to vote in CWA as their representative. The NLRB
later found that LCF managers and supervisors repeatedly threatened that LCF
85. Anna Hamilton Phelan, The Ultimate Hang-Up for Phone Workers, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
29, 1995, at B9.
86. Id.
87. Kevin Kelly, Sprint Picks up Pace, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 5, 1994, at B4.
88. Id.
89. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board Region
20 at 49-50, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 488 (Aug. 30, 1995).
90. Id. at 1.
91. Bill Adler, Breaking La Conexion, TEx. OBSERVER, Sept. 2, 1994, at 1.
92. Although workers at Sprint's local telephone companies have been represented by CWA
and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers for decades, Sprint Long Distance is
completely non-union and aggressively anti-union. See Wired for Justice, CWA NEWSLETrER
(Friends of Sprint Workers, Washington, D.C.), May 1993.
93. Phelan, supra note 85; see also CWA NEWS (Communication Workers of America,
Washington, D.C.), July 20, 1994.
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would shut down if the CWA was chosen as the employees' bargaining
representative.94
Despite continued harassment, threats and interrogations by management,
a large majority of the 177 predominately female Latina telemarketers at LCF
signed union cards authorizing CWA representation.95 By mid-March,
employees were wearing pro-union t-shirts and buttons to work. 96
On June 3, 1994, the CWA filed a representation petition with the NLRB
seeking an election covering the LCF telemarketing and customer service
employees. On that same day, more than 100 of the 177 LCF employees in
the CWA's petition for bargaining unit recognition wore t-shirts to work
indicating their support for the CWA. In response, LCF management
continued threats that the facility would close if a union was selected.
Supervisors continued to interrogate employees about their union activities,
and management reminded workers that Sprint was a non-union company and
intended to remain that way.97
In the midst of this discord, Sprint hired Maury Rosas, former Vice
President and General Manager of the Latino and Asian Market Group for
Pacific Bell and a prominent figure in the Los Angles Latino Commumity, to
be President of LCF.9" Rosas sold his home in Los Angeles and relocated
his family to San Francisco to accept the position. Rosas later testified at the
NLRB trial that when he was hired to run the LCF facility, he had no
knowledge that Sprint was considering the closure of LCF.99 President
Rosas discovered Sprint's intentions for the first time on July 5, 1994, when
he was informed that closure of LCF was one of the options due to be
considered at the next day's Sprint/LCF Board meeting.' 0 Rosas testified
he was stunned by this news, not only because he had just been hired, but
also because the information would have prompted him to handle the first
month of operations differently had he known of Sprint's intentions
sooner.101
In addition to hiring Rosas, Sprint completed a $850,000 renovation of
the LCF facility, including construction of an employee cafeteria and
94. LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988, at *11-13 (Aug. 30, 1995).
95. Jeff Pelline, Sprint Misdials With Hispanic Subsidiary, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1995, at
Al.
96. See Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
Region 20, at 2, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
97. Id. See also Judge Affirms Charges of Illegal Worker Abuse by Sprint Corp. During
Union Drive at Sprint/La Conexion Familiar in San Francisco, CWA NEWS, Aug. 31, 1995. In
an August 31, 1995, opinion by Administrative Law Judge Gerald Wacknov, Sprint was found
to have committed more than 50 § 8(a)(1) violations. During the two month trial Judge Wacknov
commented that, "I don't think I've had a case with so many instances of that sort of violations
of the National Labor Relations Act in a long time."
98. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board Region
20, at 133, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
99. Id at 133, 173-74.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 134, 174.
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additional telemarketing space, in the month prior to the closure.'02 Sprint
was also preparing for implementation of the final phase of its new marketing
program, "Aqui Contigo," which began in May and was generating increased
sales.' 3
Yet, on July 14, 1994, Rosas announced over a loudspeaker that the
facility would be closing at once, purportedly as a result of serious financial
losses. The 235 employees were instructed to immediately collect their
belongings. Workers were then searched by company security guards before
being ordered out of the premises." 4 The action was wholly unprecedented
and sudden. Unlike employees at other facility closures by Sprint, all the
LCF employees were terminated without 60 days advance notice." 5 Instead,
they were given sixty days severance pay.'1 6
While Sprint paid for its LCF workers to stay at home, customer calls
were re-routed to Sprint's Customer Service Center in Dallas, Texas. Sprint
had shifted the LCF's workload to Dallas within an hour of the LCF
closing.'17 The sudden influx of Spanish speaking calls required the Dallas
facility to mobilize employees and hire additional workers to meet the
increased workload. 10
8
The NLRB union representation election at LCF had been scheduled for
July 22.1"9 Had the CWA won the election-a strong likelihood judging
from the consistent expressions of worker support-it would have marked the
first ever union certification at a Sprint long distance facility anywhere within
its world-wide operations."'
102. Id at 140.
103. Id. at 132. "Aqui Contigo "means "here with you" in Spanish.
104. Susan Ferrias, S.F. Firm Closes Just Before Union Vote, S.F. EXAMINER, July 15,
1995, at Al, A16.
105. Brief by the Charging Parties, Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, at 32, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995). Sprint
closed another facility in Nashville, Tennessee at the same time it closed LCF. Sprint required
its Nashville employees to work out the full 60 days.
106. Id. Pursuant to the WARN Act employers of 100 or more employees must give 60-day
advance notice before plant closings. See Plant Closings: The Complete Resource Guide, 2
LABOR RELATIONS WEEK 43 at 1, Nov. 1988. As a result of receiving payment under the
WARN Act, the former employees of LCF were denied California unemployment benefits. The
California Department of Unemployment held that the penalties paid by Sprint for its violation
of the WARN Act made workers ineligible for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, the fired
employees had penalties imposed on them by the unemployment insurance department which
accused them of lying on their applications when the workers stated that the plant closure fines
they received from Sprint were not wages. Interview with Maria Blanco, Associate Professor of
Law, Golden Gate University School of Law and Associate Director of the Women's
Employment Rights Clinic, February 27, 1996.
107. Brief by the Charging Parties, Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, at 10, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
108. Id. at 10, 32.
109. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
Region 20, at 9, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
110. Wiredfor Justice, CWA NEWSLETTER (Friends of Sprint Workers, Washington, D.C.),
May, 1993.
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The San Francisco Examiner reported LCF workers were shocked and
devastated by the sudden closure. Some "workers burst into tears, at least one
woman fainted and paramedics were summoned after the closure. ..."
Sprint representatives told employees and CWA representatives that the
decision to close had been made on July 6, 1994, at the LCF Board of
Directors meeting, after Directors reassessed the facility's financial perfor-
mance. 
12
The abrupt closing of LCF triggered a surge of domestic and internation-
al protests against Sprint. In addition to filing unfair labor practice charges
against Sprint, the CWA initiated a media campaign urging Sprint's long
distance spokeswoman, Candice Bergen, to speak out against Sprint's
action." 3 Sixty-four members of Congress co-signed a letter to Sprint's
chairman, William T. Esrey, expressing concern over the unfair labor charges
and calling on Sprint to settle the case immediately." 4 On an international
level both Germany and Mexico denounced Sprint's actions." 5
B. The Section 10(]) Petition: Miller v. LCF, Inc.
On September 12, 1994, following a two month investigation into the
CWA charge, the NLRB issued an unfair labor practice complaint alleging
that Sprint had illegally closed LCF in an effort to thwart unionization in
violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRAY"6 The NLRB complaint also
alleged approximately 50 other section 8(a)(1) violations." 7 Two weeks
later, after receiving authorization from the Board, the NLRB's regional
office petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California for injunctive relief ordering Sprint to immediately reopen LCF
111. Ferrias, supra note 104, at Al.
112. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
Region 20, at 32-34, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
113. Jon Pattee, Sprint and the Shut Down of La Conexion Familiar, 23 LAB. REs. REV.,
at 16 (1995).
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Testimony of Veronika Altmeyer, Member of Management Executive
Committee of the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft, German Post and Telephone Workers Union,
February 27, 1996. Deutsche Telekom AG, the national German phone company and its French
counterpart, France Telecom, entered into a $4.2 billion global alliance with Sprint. On Decem-
ber 15, 1994, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Telekom AG passed a resolution establishing
rules of conduct for participants in Deutsche Telekom AG global ventures. The resolution
provided that respect for union representation be a basic operating principle for all joint ventures,
in accordance with the principle of freedom of association established by the constitution of the
International Labor Organization.
116. The Board devoted nearly 30 days of investigation, involving multiple investigators and
attorneys, prior to proceeding with the 10(j) in this matter.
117. NLRB Seeks Injunction to Reopen Sprint Subsidiary Where Latino Workers Lost Jobs,
DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at D14.
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and reinstate all 235 workers pursuant to section 10(j) of the National
Relations Labor Act."
8
At the time the NLRB filed the petition, it had sworn affidavits from
numerous LCF employees asserting that managers had repeatedly threatened
workers with discharge if they engaged in union activity. Moreover, the
NLRB presented evidence that LCF President Rosas told employees on the
evening of the closing that the CWA union organizing campaign was a
significant factor in LCF's decision to close. Although the NLRB's
investigation was not completed at the time of filing, NLRB attorneys
believed there was more than adequate evidence to warrant interim relief
pending final disposition by the Board.
Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court concluded that the final
investigation of the Board was not yet complete and there were lingering
factual disputes asserted by Sprint. The district court declined to accord the
NLRB deference in resolving conflicting factual evidence." 9 This proved
to be the fatal flaw in the district court's application of the new Ninth Circuit
standard. In the authors' opinion, the district court misinterpreted the Ninth
Circuit's direction regarding the degree of deference accorded to the NLRB
in a section 10(j) petition. 20 This analysis prompted the district court to
deny the NLRB deference in resolving factual disputes. Instead, the court
substituted its own credibility assessments for those of the NLRB's,
disregarding the direction of the Ninth Circuit.
In California Pacific Medical Center, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
Congress, upon vesting the courts with jurisdiction to grant preliminary
injunctions when "just and proper," intended the courts to "exercise
judgment" in determining what is just and proper as opposed to "simply
sign[ing] off on Board requests.'' The Ninth Circuit explained that the
NLRA does not require the courts to merely defer to the Board's section 10()
request. However, the courts are obliged to afford deference to Board
determinations when they evaluate "the likelihood of success on the mer-
its."'2 It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit's decision was not
intended to make it more difficult for the NLRB to prevail in section 10(j)
petitions. Rather, by collapsing the "reasonable cause" prong into the '"just
and proper" inquiry, the Ninth Circuit "conform[ed] the analysis more closely
118. Miller v.. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2911 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The CWA made
a strategic decision not to be a charging party in the 100) petition because they wanted it to be
a case of the federal government walking into court to enforce the law and the national labor
policy.
119. Id. at 2914.
120. Id.
121. Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 458 (9th Cir. 1994).
122. Id. at 458-59. Recently, the United States Supreme Court noted that "interpretations
of the Board . . . will be upheld if reasonably defensible" and that "the Boards reviews are
entitled to the greatest deference" because Congress delegated to the Board "primary
responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy." NLRB v. Town and Country
Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 453 (1995).
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to the statutory language." '23 The elements of the standard remain the
same, only the application by the court changes.
Rather than evaluating the evidence in accordance with the standard
espoused by the Ninth Circuit, the district court in LCF, Inc. tilted in the
opposite direction. Judge Walker viewed the evidence through glasses
colored by his own judicial propensity." 4 The court took it upon itself to
discredit all witnesses provided by the Board and to embellish Sprint's
defense." 5 First, the district court had to decide whether the Board was
likely to succeed on the merits of both the section 8(a)(1) violations (threats,
interrogation, surveillance) and the section 8(a)(3) violation (closing LCF and
terminating the employees to prevent unionization). If the court had found the
Board met its burden, it would then have to decide whether injunctive relief
was "just and proper."
A problem arises in fashioning the type of interim relief sought in this
type of case. If the court found that the Board met its burden only for the
8(a)(1) violations, it could not order Sprint to reopen the LCF facility because
the "injunction must be narrowly tailored to address the specific unfair labor
practice that the Board seeks to remedy."'28
A typical remedy for a section 8(a)(1) violation is a "notice posting."
This is a largely empty gesture whereby the employer merely advises
employees that they enjoy certain rights under federal labor law and that the
employer will do nothing to curtail those rights. Only a section 8(a)(3)
violation would normally support the much more significant relief of an order
to reopen a facility. Practically speaking, it would be virtually impossible to
remedy the section 8(a)(3) violations absent an order to reopen because there
is no other facility in which to reinstate all of the 235 unlawfully terminated
employees, most of whom are native Spanish speakers with limited English
proficiency.
Furthermore, where a facility has been closed, it is difficult for the Board
to enforce even its minimal posting requirement applicable to section 8(a)(1)
violations because there is no viable means for posting a notice advising
employees of their rights. Although notices can be mailed to the employee's
last known address, such a mailing would have limited effect in this case,
because so many employees had relocated after the closure.
Congress recognized in 1947 that a refusal to grant interim relief
translates into a frustration of the NLRA's purpose. 2 7 By the time of final
Board disposition, typically two or more years after the unfair practice, it is
far too late to require Sprint to reopen a facility that has been inoperative for
123. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d at 458-59.
124. See JAMES B. ATTLESON, VALUEs AND AssuaTIoNs IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2-8
(1983).
125. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2911, 2914-17 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
126. Id. at 2914 (quoting NLRB v. Melrose Processing Co., 351 F.2d 693, 700 (8th Cir.
1965)).
127. S. REP. No. 105. 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947).
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over a year. Although the fiscal impact of an order to reopen would be
modest relative to Sprint's multi-billion dollar assets, the issue of the
dispersed workers would remain a problem. In this regard, evidence
indicated that a large pool of adequately trained workers in the San Francisco
area could readily fill the positions of former employees who did not
return.' Thus, the dispersal of some of the affected workers would not
have presented an insurmountable bar to reopening the LCF facility." 9
Denial of the injunction in this case deprived the Board of its power to
correct unfair labor practices. Sprint accomplished its "unlawful objective
before being placed under any legal restraint, and thereby mak[ing] it
impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve the status quo."'30 This
outcome is precisely the result Congress intended the section 10(j) injunction
to prevent.'3
When the Board's Regional Director in San Francisco sought approval
from the General Counsel for section 10(j) injunctive relief in this case, he
was well aware of the burden he would have to meet. The NLRB had to
establish a prima facie case that Sprint closed LCF to prevent the CWA from
eroding a perfect non-union record at Sprint long distance operations.'32
The Division of Advice, the General Counsel and the Board knew their
burden under the new Ninth Circuit standard, and based on their knowledge,
experience, and expertise, agreed that injunctive relief was warranted under
the circumstances. General Counsel Fred Feinstein stated that "this is the kind
of situation for which section 10(j) was intended."'33 The statistics provid-
ed by the NLRB indicate that there is no need for the NLRB's credibility to
be an issue for the courts. "1 Apparently, these considerations were of little
merit to the district court.
C. The Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits
Instead of struggling with the dilemma of how much deference to grant
the NLRB, the district court cast the section 8(a)(1) allegations aside as
128. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
Region 20, at 257, No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
129. As of February 1996, more than one year after the original complaint was filed, the
case is still being adjudicated by the NLRB.
130. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 27 (1947).
131. Id.
132. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced
662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert, denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
133. NLRB Seeks Injunction To Reopen Sprint Subsidiary Where Latino Workers Lost Jobs,
supra note 117, at D14.
134. See Hunter, supra note 34. The Division of Advice processes requests for section 10G)
injunctions. In fiscal year 1990, the Board received 157 requests for injunctive relief, yet only
authorized 41 of the petitions to be filed in district court (26%). Of the cases brought to a
conclusion during that same year the NLRB was successful in 94% of the cases; achieving either
a satisfactory settlement or victory in litigation. This evidence demonstrates that cases approved
for § 10(j) petitions tend to prevail on the merits.
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irrelevant, even though Sprint failed to present any evidence rebutting their
validity.'35 This enabled the court to focus solely on the section 8(a)(3)
violation, the most difficult to establish. In order to meet its burden, the
Board had to show that Sprint's motivation in closing LCF was not financial,
but rather aimed at retaliating against its employees for their union activi-
ties.1 6 Once the Board established that "protected conduct was a motivat-
ing factor" in Sprint's decision to close LCF, the burden shifted to Sprint to
show that the same action would have occurred even in the absence of union
activity. 3
7
The district court found that the NLRB did not make out a prima facie
showing of Sprint's pretextual motives, and as a result denied the section
100) petition. The court reached its decision in spite of the unrebutted
evidence of innumerable threats by LCF management to close the facility in
retaliation for the employees' unionization efforts. Nor was the court
persuaded by the timing of the closure, on the eve of the election.'38 It was
similarly unmoved by substantial evidence that, prior to the CWA organizing
drive, Sprint had been preparing to aggressively advance the operations of
LCF in the coming months.'
39
The NLRB, in support of its position, offered affidavits from several LCF
employees of various rank. One affiant was Rosie Orozco, an accounts
payable specialist. Ms. Orozco stated that on July 14, 1994, the day of the
closing, LCF President Maury Rosas told her at a farewell dinner that the
union was one of the reasons Sprint closed the plant.' The district court
excluded all the testimony as hearsay. Furthermore, the court declared the
evidence not probative because the affiants were "disgruntled former
employee[s] of respondent with no personal knowledge of Sprint's motives,
who could be rehired as a result of the NLRB proceeding."'"' The Judge
found that "these circumstances call for little weight to be accorded this
evidence." 142
In determining whether the evidence presented by the Board was
sufficient, case law requires the court to adhere to the standard that "questions
of credibility of witnesses are for the trial examiner.. . who heard and saw
the witnesses. ... . Issues of credibility are to be decided by the
135. Miller v. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2911, 2913 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
136. See NLRB v. Transportation Management, Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983); Wright
Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
137. Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 1089.
138. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2915.
139. Id. at 2916.
140. Id. at 2914.
141. Id. at 2915.
142. Id.
143. NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 425 (6th Cir. 1964).
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administrative law judge or the Board when it adjudicates the case.' In
this instance, the district court made its own rulings on credibility, rather than
observe the traditional deference accorded to the NLRB.'45 It is the opinion
of these authors that the court's blanket discrediting of the LCF employees
in favor of Sprint's position can only be characterized as unwarranted judicial
activism.
The court also discounted evidence of LCF's hostility towards unioniza-
tion. Furthermore, it rejected the NLRB's argument that the timing of
Sprint's closure constituted circumstantial evidence of Sprint's unlawful
motive. The district court instead found Sprint's documentation of poor
financial performance persuasive. 46 Sprint presented evidence that between
January and March 1994, LCF lost 10,000 of its 130,000 customers. Sprint
also cited a May 1994 LCF Board of Director's meeting where directors
expressed concern about LCF's poor financial performance, and projected
losses of $3.9 million in 1994.
The NLRB rebutted Sprint's financial justifications as pretextual. The
Board demonstrated that Sprint attributed LCF's decline in customer base to
poor management.'47 Sprint brought in Maury Rosas to address this
deficiency. Sales had increased since Rosas' arrival. Sprint did not inform
Rosas that the Board of Directors was considering closing the facility within
a month.14
Sprint, moreover, spent almost one million dollars to renovate the LCF
executive suite and to construct a new employee cafeteria in the period
leading up to the facility's closing. 49 This work was completed less than
one month prior to LCF's abrupt closure. 5 Additionally, Sprint knew
when it purchased LCF that the company was projected to show losses for
five years.' Finally, there were scores of new hires during the last two
months, and new employees were brought aboard as late as the day of the
closure.'52
Nevertheless, the court found the NLRB not qualified to second-guess
Sprint's business judgments, and chastised the NLRB for failing to substanti-
ate its criticisms with expert testimony from an accountant or business
consultant. 53 The court acted in spite of the fact that NLRB case law has
144. Id. at 424.
145. Id. at 425.
146. Miller v. LCF, Inc., 147 L.RR.M. (BNA) 2911, 2915-16 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
147. Brief by the Charging Parties, Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, at 24-25, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
148. Id.
149. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
Region 20, at 140-42, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
150. Id. at 139-140.
151. Id. at 52-54.
152. Id. at 141-142.
153. Miller v. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2911, 2914 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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long held that in rebutting the NLRB's case, "the employer cannot simply
present a legitimate reason for its actions, but must also persuade by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have been taken
even in the absence of the protected conduct.
1 54
Contrary to the court's characterization, when evidence indicates the
employer's actions were taken for reasons which violate the NLRA, the
NLRB is not deemed to be second-guessing the employer's judgment.' s
Rather, the NLRB is fulfilling its duty to pursue an unfair labor practice
action to enforce the law.1
56
The court also appeared to lose sight of the fact that the section 10(j)
request was merely an interlocutory procedure. The court's charge was to
determine the likelihood that the NLRB would prevail on the merits.
5 7
According to the Ninth Circuit's direction in California Pacific Medical
Center, the district court owed "great deference to the Board's understanding
of the facts underlying its decision to apply for an injunction, and to the
Board's interpretation of the law."'15  Statements made by former LCF
management could have been admitted as admissions of a party opponent to
support Sprint's pretextual motives.159  Furthermore, Sprint's motive to
violate section 8(a)(3), was demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. The
Board "produced evidence to support the unfair labor practice charge,
together with an arguable legal theory of pretextual motive, thus making a
"threshold showing of likelihood of success" as required by the new Ninth
Circuit standard. 6 A proper application of the Ninth Circuit standard to
the evidence compelled a finding that the NLRB was likely to prevail on the
merits.
D. Balancing the Hardships
Even under the district court's finding that the Board had demonstrated
only a fair chance of succeeding on the merits, a balancing of the hardships
supported an order for injunctive relief. The public interest in protecting the
remedial power of the Board and ensuring that Sprint's unlawful practice did
not succeed before the charge was adjudicated, supported a decision in the
Board's favor.' 6 ' The district court was quick to note that the balancing
154. Hospital San Rafael, 308 N.L.R.B., 605, 607 (1992).
155. NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F. 2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1964). The Board noted
that, "the crucial factor is not whether the business reasons cited by [the employer] were good
or bad, but whether they were honestly invoked and were, in fact, the cause of the change." Id.
at 371.
156. Id
157. Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 462 (9th Cir. 1993) (Schroeder,
J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
160. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d at 460.
161. See e.g., id.
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inquiry was within its "sole discretion."' 62  However, it neglected to
consider the Ninth Circuit's direction that, "in exercising [its] sound
discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
consequences" intended to be protected by the section 10(j) injunction.'
The district court denied the section 10(j) injunction because it concluded
that reopening an "unprofitable" operation would impose a hardship on
Sprint.'64 These hardships included reassembling equipment, returning the
rerouted Spanish language customers and reconciling paid out severance
compensation.65 Nonetheless, the record does not establish that LCF was
"unprofitable," nor was the district court the proper forum to adjudicate the
merits of the underlying case. 66
The NLRB argued that a review of all the evidence demonstrated that not
only was LCF not "unprofitable," but that Sprint used unprofitability as the
pretext to close LCF and prevent unionization. 167 By summarily assuming
that LCF was "unprofitable," the district court made an adjudication on the
merits, rather than focusing on the likelihood of success.
The foremost hardship that a section 100) injunction is designed to
protect is the denial or frustration of the public interest. 61 If an injunction
is not issued and the NLRB prevails on the merits, the passage of time can
render the Board's remedy inadequate. 69  By failing to enjoin Sprint's
162. Miller v. LCF., Inc., 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2911, 2917 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting
California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d at 459).
163. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d at 459 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
164. LCF, Inc., 147 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 2417. See also Federal Judge Rejects NLRB
Request for 100) Injunction Against Sprint, DAILY LAB. REP., Nov. 23, 1994 at DI.
165. Returning rerouted customers to LCF would not pose a hardship to Sprint in light of
the fact that telecommunications technology enables Sprint to reroute customers within an hour,
as did its original rerouting of LCF customers to Dallas.
166. NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy Inc., 327 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1964).
167. According to Dr. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Director of Labor Education Research, New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University,
Sprint's actions during this period [of union campaigning] represent an all too familiar
patter of aggressive union avoidance on the part of American private sector
employers. The judges's decision in this case is also epresentative of a labor law that,in both its standards and enforcement, provides weak and ineffectual protection of the
'right to organize free of coercion and intimidation' which is its stated mission to
uphold ... [It is no surprise that less than half the NLRB elections held each year... result in union victo y, and that less than a third of all workers who attempt to
organize under the NLRA.
Dr. Kute Brontenbrenner, Testimony at the U.S Department of Labor Public Forum (Feb. 27,
1996).
168. Miller v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1993).169. Although the Board would probably prevail on a full restoration remedy, See e.g., Mid-
South Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1989), in light of the low income status of
a majority of the former LCF employees, it is likely that many of them will have relocated or
obtained other jobs.
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unlawful actions, the integrity of the collective bargaining process and the
ability of the Board to redress the violation were destroyed in this case.
The 235 former LCF employees have suffered a grave injustice. But an
even greater injustice will be perpetrated if companies are permitted to violate
employees' express section 7 rights by engaging in unlawful anti-union tactics
such as those found by the administrative law judge who heard the LCF case.
As a result of the outcome in the LCF case, employees throughout the nation
will be chilled from participating in union activities. 170
The NLRB is responsible for shaping the national labor policy. The
district court is empowered to make that policy known and give it force by
sending a message to employers that they cannot flagrantly violate the law
under a quasi-legitimate business excuse. 171 In the wake of today's political
environment, the courts need to aggressively apply existing law to achieve the
necessary deterrent effect.172
The NLRB did not appeal the denial of the section 10(j) petition even
though it believed it had a strong case. The primary reason an appeal was not
filed was that the NLRB hearing before an administrative law judge in the
underlying unfair labor practice case had already begun by the time the court
announced its decision. The NLRB reasoned that by the time an appeal of the
district court's 100) decision could be heard, the entire issue of Sprint's
culpability and the remedy to be applied would already have been decided,
rendering moot the question of the preliminary injunction. 173
E. The NLRB Trial Before the Administrative Law Judge
On August 3 0, 1995, after a two month trial, the administrative law judge
in the NLRB proceeding held that Sprint violated all section 8(a)(1)
allegations with which it had been charged "by its various and abundant
unlawful and threatening statements to employees."' 74 The administrative
law judge also found that the NLRB had indeed satisfied its prima facie case
that the closure of LCF was motivated by anti-union considerations. However,
he held that Sprint met its exculpatory burden by showing the closure was the
170. Sprint workers throughout the nation have feared retaliation for organizing. See Stanely
Holmes, Workers: Pattern of Abuse at Sprint, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 23, 1994, at Al.
171. See Phil Comstock & Maier B. Fox, Employer Tactics and Labor Law Reform, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 90 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
172. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAw 75, 86-89 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
173. Also, union officials at the CWA felt that the language of the District Court's decision
was relatively strong against them.
174. LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988, at *91 (Aug. 30, 1995). At
the hearing Sprint conceded to 148 stipulations of fact, or uncontested admissions. Sprint Vice
President for Employee Relations, Carl Doerr, admitted under penalty of perjury that he
fabricated evidence to make it appear that Sprint had not closed the facility to stop union activity
because he felt that the company did not have a strong case.
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result of adequate business considerations.'75 In so finding, the administra-
tive law judge ordered Sprint only to cease and desist from any future anti-
union activity at its closed facility, an empty mandate.
The administrative law judge summarized his finding regarding the
8(a)(1) violations with regard to the closure of LCF:
It is undenied that LCF employees have been bombarded with statements
by local LCF managers and supervisors that LCF, a business then recently
purchased by Sprint, would be closed if the Union got in. Further,
following such threats and other unlawful conduct, the facility was closedjust eight days prior to a scheduled Board election, which, the evidence
strongly indicates, would have resulted for the first time in the certification
of the Union as the employees collective bargaining representative in a
Sprint long distance facility. Then, immediately upon the closure of the
f cility, the President of LCF is alleged to have admitted that the closure
was union-related. And finally, after the closure, the Board was provided
with evidence that a high ranking Sprint official had "manufactured" a
document specifically designed to exculpate Sprint, which document was
represented to the Board during the course of its investigation. 76
The administrative lawjudge further stated that "the foregoing [is] compelling
prima facie evidence that the closure of LCF was motivated by unlawful
considerations.... ,,77
This finding by the ALJ emphasizes the critical importance of the two
Sprint/LCF Board meetings which immediately preceded LCF's closure. At
the May 1994 Board meeting many alternatives were considered, including
potential closure. At the same time, all relevant legitimate considerations
reviewed by the Sprint/LCF Board pointed to a lengthy future which would
be built on the recent productivity gains of LCF. By the July 6th Sprint/LCF
Board meeting, the employer was well aware that CWA had overwhelming
support. In addition, LCF supervisors testified at the NLRB trial that by the
end of June, their managers at LCF had come to the conclusion that CWA
was going to win the election.17
Sprint/LCF knew that the significant financial turn-around documented
by full May and June 1994 figures, the significant upward trends in all
financial categories and the meeting of previously stated financial goals,
contradicted its financial justifications for the abrupt closure of LCF.
Sprint's own budget figures indicate that sales per hour increased in both May
and June.'79 The rate of customers changing service was below the average
rate for the last four months. Gross revenues for the months of April, May
175. Id.
176. Id. at *74.
177. Id. "[Tihe General Counsel has presented a prima facie case that the closure of LCF
on July 14 was motivated by anti-union considerations." Id. at *91.
178. Brief by the Charging Parties, at 97-101, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB
LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
179. Id. at 149-151.
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and June exceeded the projected figures considered at the May 4 Sprint/LCF
Board meeting. Yet at the NLRB trial, Sprint dismissed these improvements
in LCF's productivity, claiming the economic gains were inadequate.
F. Assessment of AIJ Decision
The administrative law judge received testimony from the second highest
ranking labor official in Sprint's worldwide operations, Carl Doerr. Doerr
worked for Sprint for almost thirty years, and except for one other executive
individual who reported directly to Sprint's CEO, Vice President Doerr was
responsible for overseeing all labor relations, including oversight of LCF. 80
Doerr testified in the NLRB proceeding that he had falsified evidence in the
instant proceeding.' He further acknowledged that he did so because he
was not convinced Sprint had a sufficient defense against the unfair labor
charges.182 He claimed at trial that by April of 1994, months prior to the
CWA's filing of its petition, he had advised Sprint of a likely representation
election and the need for Sprint to establish a "paper trail."' This falsified
letter was piously highlighted in Sprint's own responses to the Board.
Fortunately, according to Sprint, the author refused to remain a party to this
deceit once he became aware that the fabricated letter was being used to
substantiate Sprint's position during a formal federal government investiga-
tion. Thus, contended Sprint, the author notified Sprint of the circumstances
relating to the falsified letter and Sprint subsequently withdrew it.
In spite of the acknowledged strength of the evidence of unlawful
motivation for the LCF closure, and of the inconsistencies in Sprint's
economic justifications, the administrative law judge accepted Sprint's
position that the closure was based on financial considerations. He concluded
there was overwhelming evidence that Sprint had valid and compelling
economic reasons for the closure."'8 In a near echoing of the district
court's opinion, issued while the NLRB trial was underway, the administra-
tive law judge held that "the NLRB is certainly in no position to substitute
its business judgment for the expertise of the Respondent."'8 5
The decisions of the administrative law judge and the district court have
permitted the first runaway shop on the electronic superhighway to go
forward. These decisions signalled employers there is little to fear when they
use technology to deprive workers of their right to organize and defeat unions
within an electronic heartbeat.
180. Brief by the Charging Parties, Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, at 31, LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988 (Aug. 30, 1995).
181. Brief by the Charging Parties, NLRB v LCF and Sprint, 78, Case No. 20-CA-26203,
Aug. 30, 1995.
182. Id. at 76-85.
183. LCF, Inc., No. 20-CA-26203, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988, at *71 (Aug. 30, 1995).
184. Id at *85.
185. Id. at *87.
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G. The Impact of LCF
on the Telecommunications Industry
The impact of the district court and the ALJ decisions threaten to
accelerate the declining work standards in our society. The recent enactment
of the Telecommunications Bill by Congress heralds a new competitive age
in telecommunications. These reforms have been touted as creating new jobs
in the growing information sector of our economy.
Telecommunications represents the only U.S. private sector service
industry with a middle-income wage standard and comprehensive bene-
fits.186 Historically, telecommunications has been the model of a high-wage,
high-skill industry. Advanced technology, a skilled work force and a union
wage standard have translated into productivity improvements and rising
wages and benefits for telecommunications workers.
Annual average earnings of non-supervisory telecommunications workers
are $37,500, twice the average annual earnings of other service sector
workers." 7 Researchers attribute these high wages to the high rate of
unionization in the telecommunications industry."8 If workers in the fast
changing information industry are deprived of the right to organize free from
threats of plant closures and job losses, the result will be a downward
pressure on worker wages and benefits in the industry.
Today, non-union telecommunications companies such as Sprint are
pursuing a low wage, minimal benefits compensation package, to compete
with other companies. New technologies and regulatory changes provide
opportunities for telecommunications employers to follow the low wage, non-
union, business strategies of the rest of the service sector. Furthermore, the
"information super-highway" enables telecommunication employers to thwart
unionization efforts by closing shop under false pretenses and transferring
work, without losing clients or profit. Ultimately, only the workers lose.
H. NAFTA Hearing
The LCF, Inc. case has attracted international attention, in large part
because it suggests that telecommunications industry giants can defeat unions
186. Janice Wood, Testimony of Janice Wood, Vice President, CWA District 9 (Feb. 27,
1996).
187. Id. According to a 1994 study by the Institute for Women's Policy Research, women
comprise half the telecommunications workforce and on average earn $27,040 annually in non-
supervisory positions. This is twice the average earnings of non-supervisory women workers in
the service sector. Similarly, minority workers in telecommunications earn almost twice as more
annually than in other service industry jobs.
188. Roger I. Abrams, Post-Modern Labor Management Relations: The Southern
BelllCommunications Workers Strategic Alliance, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 321-25 (1995). See also
Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform In a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI. KENT
L. REv. 3, 12 (1993).
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by using high technology to instantaneously transfer work from one locale to
another.
Recognizing the potential implication for telecommunications workers
worldwide, Mexico for the first time invoked a provision of the NAFTA
agreement calling for hearings on the case. In petitioning for the hearing,
held February, 1996, in San Francisco, Mexico alleged that the United States
failed to enforce its own labor laws in the handling of the LCF case. 89
The NAFTA hearing provided an international forum for the CWA and
former LCF employees to testify before representatives of the United States,
Mexican and Canadian governments regarding their unlawful treatment at the
hands of Sprint. 9" The parties also addressed the failure of the United
States to fashion an appropriate remedy for Sprint's conduct, in light of the
more than fifty violations of federal labor law proven in the LCF administra-
tive law proceeding.' 9 '
Mexican officials noted that the NAFTA provisions, which are designed
to ensure the uniform enforcement of each country's respective labor laws,
were not applied at any point during the Sprint/LCF proceedings. Phillip
Bowyer, General Secretary of the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Interna-
tional (PTTI) 192 stated:
The Sprint case, in my view, is one of, if not the most, outrageous
examples of the violations of workers' right to form a union to occur in our
industry world-wide. Even more shocking is that the entire law enforcement
apparatus of the U.S. Federal Court system [has] proven inadequate or
unwilling to either prevent or remedy the flagrant violation of basic trade
union rights by Sprint.1
93
The PTTI's view is shared by the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU). The ICFTU conducted a "1995 Survey of Violations of
Trade Union rights," which concluded that in the United States,
[w]orkers often have no effective redress in the face of abuses by employ-
ers. Inadequate remedies available to workers who have been fired illegally
for trade union activity, and ineffective penalties against employers who
189. NAFTA: CWA Tells Committee That Labor Law Failed to Protect Sprint Workers,
DAILY LAB. REP., Feb. 28, 1996, at D12.
190. The official topic of the hearing was "The Effect of Sudden Plant Closings on the
Principle of Freedom of Association and The Right To Organization," but the crux of the hearing
focused on Sprint's action. Sprint did not send a representative to testify on its behalf, however,
it did submit a statement.
191. Both authors of this article attended the NAFFA hearings in San Francisco on February
27, 1996.
192. PTII represents 4.6 million workers in 223 affiliated trade unions in 117 countries, in
the telecommunications, information, postal and electricity industries.
193. Philip Bowyer, testimony before U.S. Dept of Labor Pub. Forum on the effects of
sudden plant closures and its impact on the principle of freedom of association and the right of
workers to organize (Feb. 27, 1996).
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illegally fire them, place severe obstacles in the path of workers seeking tojoin trade unions. 194
The unprecedented NAFTA proceedings examined the denial of 10()
injunctive relief, the administrative law judge's failure to find unlawful
closure under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, and pending rulings on exceptions
briefs filed by the NLRB regional office, the Communications Workers of
America, and Sprint. Eighteen of the twenty-one speakers expressed the
overwhelming sentiment that while the NLRA and the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation guarantee all necessary labor protections,
including the right to organize, neither statute provides appropriate remedies
to deter anti-union behavior and prevent companies from closing down
facilities and shattering workers lives under the guise of global competition.
The outcome of the DOL/NAFTA public hearings is to be announced in a
public report due to be issued by the National Administrative Office at the
end of summer, 1996.95
CONCLUSION
The NLRB is currently appealing the administrative law judge's decision
to the five-member Board. NLRB counsel hope to prevail on the section
8(a)(3) violation, and gain more substantial penalties against Sprint. A more
appropriate remedial order would have found in favor of the Section 8(a)(3)
charge and ordered the reopening of the LCF facility in 1994.
Based on the more than fifty unfair labor practices found, minimum relief
demands a make whole remedy whereby employees are paid their lost wages.
A just order would mandate that, in the absence of reopening, Sprint should
provide former LCF employees with comparable jobs and financial assistance
for relocating.
When used properly by both the NLRB and the courts, section 10(j)
injunctions can powerfully deter employers from engaging in unfair labor
practices and avoiding substantial penalties. If the Board continues to be
selective in the cases it authorizes for section 100) relief, the NLRB will
maintain its credibility in court and bolster its arguments for granting relief.
By adhering to the policies articulated by the NLRA, and affording the
appropriate deference to the Board in carrying out the Act's purpose, district
courts can enforce the nation's labor law policy. This in turn will deter avid
violators and empower employees seeking to exercise their section 7 rights.
The district court had the perfect opportunity to send this message to the
public when the NLRB sought interim relief against Sprint. Unfortunately, the
court construed the Ninth Circuit's new modified traditional equitable criteria
194. Id.
195. To receive a copy of the transcripts from the DOL hearing or the final NAO report
contact the NAO at (202)501-6653.
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test as a safeguard designed to inhibit injunctive relief pending Board
adjudication.
On the contrary, by modifying the "reasonable cause" standard, the Ninth
Circuit simply conformed the analysis more closely to the statutory language
while maintaining ample consideration of the NLRA's underlying purpose.
La Conexion Familiar was a ripe case for section 10(j) relief. However, the
court failed to recognize its importance. As long as the law encourages Sprint
and other employers to violate employees' rights, it will become harder and
harder "to join together and strike out against humiliation and indignity."'96
196. Meister, supra note 1.
1996]
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